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INTRODUCTION 
Don’t say that he’s hypocritical; 
Say, rather, that he’s apolitical. 
“Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? 
That’s not my department,” says Wernher von Braun. 
Tom Lehrer, The Ballad of Wehrner von Braun 
 
The debate sparked by Herring v. United States1 is a microcosm of the 
quintessential debate about the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusio-
nary rule and ultimately the appropriate breadth of police authority and 
constitutional review by courts.2  The Good Faith Doctrine focuses on situ-
ations in which it is clear, in hindsight, that authority was wrongly exer-
cised.  Whether courts choose to suppress evidence to deter police from 
committing similar mistakes in the future reveals their position on the ap-
propriate balance between efficiency and procedural justice, a balance well 
illustrated in Herbert Packer’s classic book The Limits of the Criminal 
Sanction.3 
In the book, Packer provided two “ideal type” models of the criminal 
process: the Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model.4  Crime 
control emphasizes an efficient criminal process through early determina-
tion of guilt by law enforcement agents.5  The model requires substantial 
 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 2. See Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the 
Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 
423-33 (2009) (tracing the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to police 
discretion). 
 3. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
 4. Neither of the two models is designed to provide a realistic description of the crimi-
nal justice system.  As Packer explains, they are merely “ideal types,” which provide two 
ends of a spectrum along which one might locate a specific system or track transitions in its 
adherence to certain principles. Id. at 152-54.  It is important to keep in mind that Packer’s 
book was written in 1968, based on a piece published in 1964, at the height of the Warren 
Court’s involvement in constitutionalizing criminal procedure; Packer used this model to 
demonstrate how constitutional incorporation encouraged a move from crime control to due 
process.  For more background on these choices, see Kent Roach, Four Models of the Crim-
inal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (1999). 
5. For example, Packer points out: 
The presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal efficient-
ly with large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands.  The supposition is 
that the screening processes operated by police and prosecutors are reliable indica-
tors of probable guilt.  Once a man has been arrested and investigated without be-
ing found to be probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a determination 
has been made that there is enough evidence of guilt to permit holding him for 
further action, then all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the 
view that he is probably guilty.  The precise point at which this occurs will vary 
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deference to police officers and prosecutors, the “gatekeepers” of the crim-
inal process.6  As a corollary, the model allows patience with their mis-
takes.7  By contrast, the Due Process Model’s main goal is preserving accu-
racy and avoiding the conviction of the innocent.8  Under a due process 
paradigm, law enforcement discretion is seen as potentially biased9 and is 
therefore carefully curtailed by constitutional review and procedural hur-
dles as a “quality control” mechanism.10 
Packer’s models have been widely critiqued over the years.11  Among 
the more convincing critiques is the notion that the models do not share an 
 
from case to case; in many cases it will occur as soon as the suspect is arrested, or 
even before, if the evidence of probable guilt that has come to the attention of the 
authorities is sufficiently strong.  But in any case the presumption of guilt will be-
gin to operate well before the “suspect” becomes a “defendant.” 
PACKER, supra note 3, at 160. 
 6. Id. at 158-61. 
7. Packer continues: 
In the presumption of guilt this model finds a factual predicate for the position that 
the dominant goal of repressing crime can be achieved through highly summary 
processes without any great loss of efficiency . . . , because of the probability that, 
in the run of cases, the preliminary screening process operated by the police and 
the prosecuting officials contain adequate guarantees of reliable fact-finding.  In-
deed, the model takes an even stronger position.  It is that subsequent processes, 
particularly those of a formal adjudicatory nature, are unlikely to produce as relia-
ble fact-finding as the expert administrative process that precedes them is capable 
of.  The criminal process thus must put special weight on the quality of adminis-
trative fact-finding.  It becomes important, then, to place as few restrictions as 
possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding processes and to limit 
restrictions to such as enhance reliability, excluding those designed for other pur-
poses. 
Id. at 162.  This systemic reliance on administrative processes is confirmed by empiri-
cal evidence pointing to the large amounts of discretion exercised daily by police offic-
ers.  This was noticed by police scholars during the Warren Court era. JEROME H. 
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
(1966); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: 
THE EVIDENCE (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) [hereinafter FAIRNESS 
AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING]. 
 8. PACKER supra note 3, at 164-65. 
9. The Crime Control Model: 
[A]s we have suggested, places heavy reliance on the ability of investigative and 
prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their distinctive skills 
are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account of what 
actually took place in an alleged criminal event.  The Due Process Model rejects 
this premise and substitutes for it a view of informal, nonadjudicative fact-finding 
that stresses the possibility of error. 
Id. at 163. 
 10.  Id. at 230-33. 
 11.  See, e.g., Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due 
Process Model, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2010). 
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epistemological basis, that the Due Process Model relates largely to doc-
trinal and normative mandates, while the Crime Control Model is by nature 
a pragmatic description of the everyday management of law enforcement.12  
Scholars today widely acknowledge that the post-Warren Court’s decisions 
reflect a pendulum swing toward crime control.  The shift is explained in 
four main themes.13  First, the post-Warren Court emphasized that the ulti-
mate mission of the criminal justice system is convicting the guilty and en-
suring that the innocent go free, rather than creating bright-line rules.  The 
Court placed more emphasis on the defendant’s actual guilt—a practical 
application of Packer’s “presumption of guilt.”14  Second, the Court shifted 
from relying on clear standards of action to allowing an assessment of po-
lice activities through a “totality of the circumstances” test.15  Third, the 
post-Warren Court expressed more deference to police discretion, a recur-
ring theme of acknowledging that police act in good faith under difficult 
conditions.16  Finally, the Court tended to intervene less on behalf of the 
defendant on appeal, particularly collateral attacks before state courts.17  
Significant for this paper, these characteristics of the post-Warren Court are 
closely correlated with an important feature of the Crime Control Model—
the increasing reliance on earlier steps in the criminal process and, in par-
ticular, broad deference to police discretion.  Everyday officers exercise 
tremendous discretion and make on-the-spot decisions about exercising 
 
 12. Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational 
Perspective, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 407 (1973); see also SKOLNICK, supra note 7; FAIRNESS 
AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7. 
 13. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 4-10 (5th ed. 2008). 
 14.  Id. at 4.  The best example of this is perhaps the erosion of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), to a “stepchild” in the constitutional family of rights, held by justices to be 
technical. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649 (1984); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 
(1974). 
 15. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 13, at 6-7.  This transition is notable in the 
shift from defining probable cause as two “prongs”—veracity and basis of knowledge, to 
examining it in light of the “totality of the circumstances.” Compare Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), with Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  We discuss this later in greater detail. 
 16. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 13, at 7-8.  See, for example, the expansion in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and its continuous erosion until the recent deci-
sion in Herring, which gives the police leeway when relying on their own mistakes, as long 
as they are merely “negligent,” rather than “reckless” or “intentional.” 
 17. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 13, at 8-10.  The narrowing of the door on 
habeas is particularly important. See Teague v. United States, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  In keep-
ing with the main theme, actual innocence—a situation in which the “presumption of guilt” 
is violated—is not a barrier from collateral attack. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
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their authority18 or refraining from doing so.19  Courts are well aware of 
this feature but defer to vague standards when it comes to police discretion.  
Courts do not view police discretion as a “necessary evil” but as a desirable 
feature of professionalism.20  There are sound reasons for the policy.  No 
web of bright-line rules could cover all situations in which police officers 
find themselves, and the system has vested interest in assuring both officer 
resourcefulness and officer safety.21  Additionally, broad discretion to dis-
card potential cases early in the process is an efficient way to control ex-
pensive and time-consuming caseloads.  Mistakes, however, are bound to 
occur in this process and the application of the exclusionary rule reflects 
the extent to which courts are willing to “forgive” police mistakes for the 
sake of efficiency.  A simple reading of Herring reveals a triumph of crime 
control over due process.  The Supreme Court expanded the good faith ex-
ception in an opinion that applies broadly on its face.  Herring declares, 
In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression 
must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, we con-
clude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that 
described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of consti-
tutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.”  In 
such a case, the criminal should not “go free because the constable has 
blundered.”22 
The holding sparked a lively debate about the fate of the exclusionary 
rule.  Some commentators described the Herring decision as a “fundamen-
 
 18. Justice Warren's decision in Terry v. Ohio—decided at the height of the due process 
revolution—is an excellent example of the Court's awareness of the realities of police dis-
cretion: "[I]t is frequently argued that, in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dan-
gerous situations on citystreets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible res-
ponses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess.” 392 U.S. 1, 10 
(1968). 
 19. Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552-54 (1960). 
 20. For example, Terry stated: 
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diver-
sity.  They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually use-
ful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or inju-
ries, or loss of life.  Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece.  Some 
of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the 
injection of some unexpected element into the conversation. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. 
 21. A good example of this is the emergence of the “protective sweep” of houses, Mary-
land v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), and cars, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), 
which are aimed at police safety and rely on an assessment of discretion regarding “reason-
able suspicion.”  The suspicion needs to be articulable, but its nature is not proscribed. 
 22. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
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tal shift in exclusionary rule analysis.”23  Others argued that Herring is not 
a remarkable decision because it does not settle the complicated question of 
suppression when the law enforcement officer herself made the mistake.24  
Both arguments have some merit because Herring’s importance regarding 
who makes the mistake is neither clear on the face of the opinion, nor in 
current case law interpreting the good faith rule. 
This distinction is vital for understanding Herring, and we therefore of-
fer a new way to read the case.  Relying on Herring’s facts, as well as the 
current circuit split with regard to illegal predicate searches, and on a pre-
vious case, Arizona v. Evans,25 this Article argues that Herring reflects a 
healthy dosage of real politik and particular awareness of the realities of 
fragmented policing.  American policing involves multiple agencies with a 
largely local focus and a lack of strong hierarchical oversight at the state or 
federal level.  The outcome of Herring, when limited to its facts, acknowl-
edges the complexities of decisionmaking, information-sharing, and over-
view in a multilateralized policing structure; it takes into account the possi-
bility that vague responsibilities and redundancies will lead to mistakes and 
acknowledges that multilateralism significantly decreases the expectations 
of accountability and the effects of deterrent court rulings.  When read in 
this fashion, Herring reflects a deep understanding of the organizational 
dimension of policing.  Thus, Herring can be analogized to the Warren 
Court’s realistic decision in Terry v. Ohio,26 in which realities from the 
field entered case law in a more explicitly drafted opinion. 
The Court’s realism, however, has a dark side.  Courts must be careful 
that realism’s shortcomings do not outweigh its advantages.27  On one 
hand, Herring contributes to a richer exclusionary rule discourse as a deci-
sion that fosters realistic understandings of accountability structures.  Real-
ism is more helpful for shaping effective deterrence structures than the ab-
stract assumption that Supreme Court decisions deter law enforcement 
agencies.  On the other hand, Herring also implies complacency with 
flawed accountability structures and allows the government to shirk re-
sponsibility for its mistakes by hiding behind multiple agencies and blur-
ring the path of accountability.  Herring allows a potential for future abuse 
 
 23. Steve C. Posner, Posner on Herring v. United States, the Exclusionary Rule, and the 
USA PATRIOT Act “Fall of the Wall”, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3647 (LEXIS), Feb. 6, 2009. 
 24. Andrew Z. Lipson, The Good Faith Exception as Applied to Illegal Predicate 
Searches: A Free Pass to Institutional Ignorance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1147 (2009). 
 25. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 27. It could be said that, as with Terry, there is a “good Herring” and a “bad Herring.”  
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1097, 1097-1100 (1998). 
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by discouraging efficient collaboration between agencies and incentivizing 
redundancies and inefficiency.  Part I of the Article presents our interpreta-
tion of Herring as a case hinging upon the question “who made the mis-
take?” as the decisive element in establishing good faith.  We rely on the 
actual holding of Herring in light of its facts, on the Court’s previous deci-
sion in Evans, and on the current circuit split with regard to illegal predi-
cate searches to conclude that a narrow and reasonable reading of the Her-
ring doctrine is the appropriate reading.  Part II expands upon the realities 
of fragmented policing that explain the Herring decision.  This Article 
presents findings from the fields of public policy, criminology, and geogra-
phy to support the assertion that American policing is characterized by a 
fragmented, localized structure with little overview and control, and much 
reliance on local agencies.  Subsequently, Part II discusses problematic im-
plications, detailing potential abuses and disincentives of not holding one 
police agency accountable for the mistakes of another.  Finally, the seg-
ment argues that a “moving target” government party to the criminal 
process is fundamentally unfair to defendants without proper safeguards.  
Part III proceeds to discuss the legal and administrative paths to deal with 
the problem of fragmentation and accountability, with suggestions for col-
laboration and overview in the administrative context.  The section then 
shifts to the legal arena and demonstrates how U.S. and Canadian law have 
handled fragmentation in other contexts.  We then offer a solution: a multi-
variate analysis of the proper deterrence incentives, which will not only 
provide protection to the citizen tackling “moving targets,” but also clearer 
and more detailed guidelines for future decisions. 
I.  HERRING IN CONTEXT: POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN A REALITY OF 
FRAGMENTATION 
A. Herring’s Facts: Agency and Reliance 
The story behind Herring is a bureaucratic computer blunder.  The Dale 
County Sheriff’s Office maintained warrant records for Dale County, and 
Sharon Morgan worked as the warrant clerk.28  Generally, the clerk or 
judge would call the Sheriff’s Office to notify them when the court recalled 
a bench warrant so that it could be removed from the system.29 
On July 7, 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson of neighboring Coffee 
County learned that the defendant stopped at the Coffee County Sheriff’s 
 
 28. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009). 
 29. Id. 
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Office to pick up some items.30  He asked his county’s warrant clerk, Sandy 
Pope, to check if the defendant had any outstanding warrants.31  Sandy 
Pope called Sharon Morgan in Dale County, who checked her computer da-
tabase and confirmed an active arrest warrant for failure to appear on a fe-
lony criminal case.32  Sandy Pope relayed the information to Investigator 
Mark Anderson.  He asked Sharon Morgan to fax a copy of the warrant as 
confirmation.33  Investigator Mark Anderson stopped the defendant in his 
car, leading to the discovery of a gun and drugs within a few hundred yards 
of the Coffee County Sheriff’s Office.34 
Sandy Pope did not, however, find a copy of the warrant in her files.35  
She called the court clerk and learned that the judge recalled the warrant 
five months prior.36  Sandy Pope called Sharon Morgan to inform her of the 
recall and Sharon Morgan contacted Investigator Mark Anderson by secure 
radio within ten to fifteen minutes.37  By the time she reached him, the ar-
rest and search had already occurred.38  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that someone in Dale County should have updated the data-
base, found the error negligent and not reckless or deliberate, discussed 
extensively the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and affirmed the convic-
tion.39  The Supreme Court agreed.40 
The Supreme Court concluded, “Petitioner’s claim that police negli-
gence automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with the prin-
ciples underlying the exclusionary rule, as they have been explained in our 
cases.”41  While the Court admitted that suppression of evidence for a neg-
ligent police mistake is instructional, it explicitly declared that the benefit 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 699-700; see also United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 40. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699. 
 41. Id. at 704.  Thus, the Court explained, 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate 
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deter-
rence is worth the price paid by the justice system.  As laid out in our cases, the 
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, 
or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.  The error in this case 
does not rise to that level. 
Id. at 702. 
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does not outweigh the harm to the justice system.42  Rather, the Court ana-
logized to the legal standard for traversal of a search warrant, which re-
quires intentional or reckless disregard for the truth.43  Significantly, the 
Court also characterized the facts as “isolated negligence attenuated from 
the arrest.”44 
B. Herring’s Predecessors: The Good Faith Doctrine in Leon and 
Evans 
Supreme Court decisions that preceded Herring suggest that the identity 
of the agent is a significant factor in analyzing accountability.  In United 
States v. Leon,45 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court first established an 
exception to the exclusionary rule for a law enforcement officer’s “good 
faith” reliance on a facially valid search warrant that is later determined to 
be invalid.  The Court explicitly directed trial courts to consider both the 
actions of the affiant as well as the actions of the officers who execute the 
warrant in considering good faith reliance.46 
Subsequent decisions expanded good faith exceptions to include reliance 
on a magistrate’s failure to make clerical corrections on the warrant,47 re-
liance on a statute later declared to be unconstitutional,48 and reliance on a 
warrant entry mistakenly present in the court’s warrant records.49  Many 
assumed a dividing line whereby the court would suppress evidence result-
ing from a law enforcement officer’s error and not for an error by anyone 
else.  The argument arose after Evans, where officers relied on an invalid 
warrant in records maintained by the court.50  The Supreme Court’s opinion 
explained that suppression for a judicial error does not serve the same in-
structional purpose as suppression for an error by a law enforcement offic-
er.51  Thus, “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence ob-
tained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was 
 
 42. Id. at 704. 
 43. Id. at 703; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishing the redact 
and retest analysis for intentional lies or reckless disregard for the truth in a search warrant 
affidavit). 
 44. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. 
 45. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 46. Id. at 923 n.24. 
 47. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
 48. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) 
 49. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
 50. Id. at 3-4. 
 51. Id. at 14-16. 
AVIRAM ET AL._CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:40 PM 
718 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
ultimately found to be defective.”52  The distinction between the facts in 
Evans and Herring is that in Herring, the mistaken records were main-
tained by law enforcement employees, rather than by the court; and, it is 
important to note that, despite Herring’s focus on mens rea as the primary 
test for good faith, the decision did not overrule Evans. 
C. Herring’s Uncertainties: The Debate on Herring’s Application to 
Illegal Predicate Searches 
Had only the mens rea rationale of Herring been universally accepted, 
all questions of agent identity and fragmentation would have been resolved 
and the material question would be the egregiousness of the mistake.  Cir-
cuit courts split regarding the broader implications.  As Andrew Lipson 
points out, the fact patterns of Herring and its predecessors leave this ques-
tion open as all five good faith decisions from the Supreme Court still in-
volve good faith reliance by one actor on another.53  Thus, Lipson argues 
that the good faith exception cannot apply where the same officer violates 
the Fourth Amendment with respect to a defendant before he personally ob-
tains a warrant.54  He terms this conduct the “illegal predicate search.”55  
To Lipson, Herring simply affirms the previous principles of the Fourth 
Amendment by extending the good faith rule to illegal predicate searches,56 
while circuits that accept predicate searches depart dramatically from the 
Supreme Court’s good faith case law.57  Circuits that depart apply a rule 
that errors “close to the line of validity” do not merit suppression.58  Lipson 
argues that such a rule encourages police misconduct when applied to an 
officer’s own mistake and relies heavily on comparing three appellate opi-
nions with similar facts spanning nearly a decade.  Based on subsequent 
opinions in 1991 and 1996 after a 1989 ruling, he argues “it appears that 
the police forces in those cases did nothing to change their practice in air-
ports in order to comport with the law.”59  Thus, he concludes, “Without 
exclusion, there is no reason for police departments and their officers to 
change their practices of violating the law.”60 
 
 52. Krull, 480 U.S. at 348; see also People v. Machupa, 872 P.2d 114, 119-24 (Cal. 
1994). 
 53. Lipson, supra note 24, at 1154. 
 54. Id. at 1148. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1147-48. 
 57. Id. at 1167. 
 58. Id. at 1168; see also United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 59. Lipson, supra note 24, at 1169. 
 60. Id. 
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D. Herring’s Silence: Implicitly Acknowledging Fragmentation 
Case law that preceded Herring and the lower-court controversy that 
remained in its aftermath strongly suggest that the Court’s decision was 
eased by the facts of the case, which featured one agent relying on another 
agent’s mistake.  The expansive transition from affirming police reliance 
on non-police governmental agents, as in Evans, to affirming reliance of 
one policing agency on another, becomes understandable if we assume that 
the Court did not see much difference between these two situations.  The 
similarities stem from an understanding of the fragmented nature of Ameri-
can policing and the need to rely on other agencies’ discretion and informa-
tion. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Herring never explicit-
ly delves into a realistic description of policing.  It is useful to contrast 
Herring’s silence to the much more explicit and realistic reasoning of Ter-
ry.  In Terry, decided at the height of the Warren Court era and authored by 
Justice Warren himself, the Court upheld police authority to conduct lesser 
searches and seizures, such as stops and frisks, on the basis of reasonable 
suspicion, a lesser suspicion level than that which is required for full 
searches and arrests.61  While the holding—especially in light of its proge-
ny—appears to be a classic example of crime control, some commentators 
have argued that Terry’s “good” aspect is the Court’s acknowledgment of 
the realities of policing, and that subsequent decisions wade into an area of 
police conduct that it had previously left completely unregulated for state 
agents and subject to a rigid probable cause analysis for federal agents.62  
In doing so, as Warren’s clerk at the time explained later, Terry “set an im-
portant example for the Supreme Court and lower courts in later cases in 
their approach to the myriad issues that grow out of what Chief Justice 
Warren called ‘the protean variety of the street encounter.’”63 
Had Herring been explicit in its acknowledgment of fragmented polic-
ing, it could have been seen as a decision in the spirit of Terry—one that 
recognizes certain characteristics of the organization of policing, brings 
them into the light, and sets boundaries for police authority.  Rather, the 
Herring opinion elected not to mention the divisions between the depart-
ments.  The United States, however, briefed the following issue for Her-
ring: 
 
 61. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 62. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1098-99. 
 63. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 898 (1998). 
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The lack of appreciable deterrent effects that would flow from requiring 
suppression in this case is further confirmed by the fact that the employee 
who made the negligent error in recordkeeping works for an entirely dif-
ferent police department than the officers who made the arrest.64 
The United States went on to brief several issues dealing with agency 
and then distinguish several cases based on the difficulty of imputing 
knowledge between agencies.65  At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts 
mentioned the problem of imposing responsibility for checking warrants at 
every chain of command and specifically discussed the likelihood of poor 
resources for particular departments.66  Justice Alito asked about the diffi-
culty of dealing with protected civil-service employees in different depart-
ments,67 and Justice Scalia specifically indicated that he would not impute 
knowledge to the officer.68  The briefings and comments strongly suggest 
that the Justices’ perceptions of how to realistically assess policing today 
directed their decision. 
However, even had the Herring opinion included factually descriptive 
honesty of the Terry variety, it would not necessarily ensure a healthy poli-
cy outcome.  In the context of Terry, frank discussion of overenforcement 
against minorities69 did not prevent racial profiling.70  In the context of 
Herring, fragmentation of accountability and governmental fairness must 
be balanced against the necessity of accountability. 
II.  MOVING TARGETS: AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
POLICING 
A. Policing in America: Plural, Multilateralized, Fragmented 
In order to understand Herring, it is useful to examine the realities of a 
policing strategy referred to by police scholars as the “police industry.”71  
In a study of democratic countries, David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shear-
 
 64. Brief for the United States at 33, Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) 
(No. 07-513). 
 65. Id. at 36-43. 
 66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695 (No. 07-513). 
 67. Id. at 21-22. 
 68. Id. at 11-12. 
 69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968). 
 70. Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1275-77 (1998); see also Scott E. Sundby, An Ode 
to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1133 (1998). 
 71. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 47. 
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ing found a restructuring of policing worldwide, manifested as an increased 
fragmentation between different factions of policing.72  Part of this trend is 
increased privatization of police services, but Bayley and Shearing refer to 
a broader process of “multilateralization.”73  Authorization and execution 
of policing are segregated so that commercial companies, nongovernmental 
authorizers of policing, individuals, and governments provide policing.74  
Many nongovernmental providers now perform the same tasks as the pub-
lic police.75  Governmental providers tend to prevent crime through punish-
ing, but nongovernmental providers do so through exclusion and the regu-
lation of access.76  Even Jérôme Ferret, who objects to the term 
“multilateralization,” highlights the considerable part played increasingly 
by local agencies, which is particularly impressive in European countries 
with a strong state tradition.77 
The United States led the fragmentation curve for quite some time for a 
variety of political reasons.78  Federalism and emphasis on municipal poli-
tics led to a persistent reluctance to unify fragmented government,79 in par-
ticular to consolidate police departments or centralize law enforcement in 
other ways.80  Many attempts to consolidate police departments faced 
strong resistance from local agencies, due to political and bureaucratic in-
terests.81  Local political control is perceived as a vital aspect of the legiti-
macy of the police.82 
As an outcome, policing services are offered to the public by different 
providers.83  While the estimated count of all federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies varies, Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frdyl count 
 
 72. DAVID H. BAYLEY & CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, THE NEW STRUCTURE OF POLICING: 
DESCRIPTION, CONCEPTUALIZATION, AND RESEARCH AGENDA vii-3 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187083.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. at 13-15. 
 75. Id. at 13-14. 
 76. Id. at vii. 
 77. Jérôme Ferret, The State, Policing and “Old Continental Europe”: Managing the 
Local/National Tension, 14 POLICING & SOC’Y 49 (2004). 
 78. See Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, The Transformation of Policing?, 42 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 131 (2002) (comparing the amount of public police in the United States 
with that in the United Kingdom). 
 79. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 14-16 
(2001). 
 80. Id. at 233. 
 81. See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN POLICING (1978). 
 82. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 51. 
 83. Id. at 48 (citing OSTROM ET AL., supra note 81). 
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21,143 agencies and mention that others have estimated around 40,000.84  
These agencies significantly vary in size.85 
Municipal police departments provide the lion’s share of police service 
in the United States.86  The Bureau of Justice Statistics mentions 13,524 
agencies, with only 46 of these police departments employing more than 
1,000 officers, and 771 of them with only one officer.87  Local law en-
forcement at the county level includes approximately 3,000 sheriff’s de-
partments.88  While fragmentation implies both redundancy and specializa-
tion, it also requires collaboration and division of labor between the 
multiple agencies.  Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitak-
er, who conducted a large-scale survey of police services from the perspec-
tive of producers and consumers explained police as an “industry model.”89  
They found that different functions were performed by different agencies.  
Duties such as general area patrol (the most resource-consuming police 
task) and traffic patrol are conducted by local agencies, as well as state po-
lice and highway patrol, based on geographical jurisdiction.90  Within local 
police agencies, most traffic duties are performed by general patrol offic-
ers, and more complicated tasks, such as homicide investigations, are often 
outsourced to the county agencies.91  Auxiliary services, such as radio 
communication, pretrial detention, entry-level training, and crime laborato-
ry are shared services.92  There are also a variety of informal arrangements 
for assistance and sharing information.93  The report found more coopera-
tion between agencies than expected.94  Even within agencies, police offic-
ers have broad discretion about engaging in law enforcement, and large ur-
ban departments tend to compartmentalize their various services.95 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 49. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 81, at 3. 
 90. Id. at 71-75, 105-12.  For more on the geographical distribution of policing, see 
Nicholas R. Fyfe, The Police, Space, and Society: The Geography of Policing, 15 PROGRESS 
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 249 (1991). 
 91. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 81, at 320. 
 92. Id. at 321. 
 93. Id. at 321-24. 
 94. Id. at 321. 
 95. See HUNG-EN SUNG, THE FRAGMENTATION OF POLICING IN AMERICAN CITIES: 
TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF POLICE-CITIZEN RELATIONSHIPS (2002).  It should be 
mentioned that the book was criticized for using a twenty-five-year-old database. R. L. 
Garner, Book Review: The Fragmentation of Policing in American Cities: Toward an 
Ecological Theory of Police-Citizen Relationships, 23 CRIM. JUST. REV. 410, 410 (2003).  
This, however, demonstrates that fragmentation is not a new phenomenon. 
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The federal level encompasses sixty-nine law enforcement agencies.96  
There are also special district police, such as the American Indian Tribal 
Law Enforcement police.97  Federal influence on local state agencies is 
very limited and federal initiatives consistently play a very small part in lo-
cal policing.98  Only senior officers train at the police academy.99  Some 
police departments are supervised by the federal government through con-
sent decrees aimed at improving services and curbing police brutality.100  
Until recently, little was known about the impact of post-9/11 initiatives on 
federal-state collaboration.101  New research, however, in sixteen diverse 
police agencies suggests that the federal pressure to increase anti-terrorism 
enforcement and intelligence gathering practices did not trickle down as 
hoped.102  The call to shift toward proactive data gathering met much resis-
tance among local agencies, many of whom actually bolstered their com-
munity policing and outreach efforts.103 
The state role is usually confined to setting minimum standards for the 
certification of police officers104 or to the creation of law governing special 
police actions, such as high-speed pursuits or domestic violence inci-
dents.105  As with federal control, independence and fragmentation of local 
agencies considerably limits the effects of state control.  For example, Ry-
ken Grattet and Valerie Jenness found that despite statewide policies about 
hate crime, different localities interpreted these completely differently and 
implemented them in very different ways.106 
In addition to federal, state, and local agencies, policing is provided by a 
broad range of specialized organizations, such as the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration,107 as well as by an enormous private sector.108  
 
 96. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 50. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 53. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 52. 
 102. Christopher W. Ortiz et al., Policing Terrorism: The Response of Local Police 
Agencies to Homeland Security Concerns, 20 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 91, 101, 103, 106 (2007). 
 103. Id. at 107. 
 104. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 54. 
 105. Id. at 55. 
 106. Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: 
Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 893 (2005). 
 107. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 56. 
 108. Id. at 55; see also RICHARD V. ERICSON & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, POLICING THE RISK 
SOCIETY (1997). 
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Thus, some commentators perceive fragmentation as an aspect of privatiza-
tion and commodification of policing.109 
To mitigate the effects of fragmentation, local police agencies share ser-
vices.110  The International City Management Association estimates that 
police communications and jail services are among the government servic-
es most commonly shared through contracting or joint agreements between 
local governments.111  In addition, police offices range from federally to 
locally created joint taskforces as well as similar ad-hoc collaborations.112 
Steadfast support for fragmentation and localization of policing can be 
attributed to some of the policing innovations introduced in the last few 
decades.  One such innovation was the introduction of the community po-
licing paradigm, conceived in the late 1970s113 and implemented through-
out the 1990s,114 which aimed at moving away from reactive, politicized 
crime control toward citizen involvement and a problem-solving mentali-
ty.115  While definitions of community policing differ even among police 
officers,116 it is common to understand it as Robert Trojanowicz, Victor E. 
Kappeler, Larry K. Gaines, and Bonnie Bucqueroux define it—as an “or-
ganizational strategy that promotes a new partnership between people and 
their police . . . [who] must work together as equal partners to identify, pri-
oritize, and solve contemporary problems.”117  Fragmentation and localiza-
tion are important features of community policing, because, as Trojano-
wicz, Kappeler, Gaines, and Bucqueroux point out, it “rests on 
decentralizing and personalizing police service, so that line officers have 
the opportunity, freedom, and mandate to focus on community building and 
community-based problem solving, so that each and every neighborhood 
 
 109. See Tim Newburn, The Commodification of Policing: Security Networks in the Late 
Modern City, 38 URB. STUD. 829, 832, 840 (2001). 
 110. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 52. 
 111. Id. 
 112. For more on the evolution of such collaborative efforts, see FIGHTING URBAN CRIME: 
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL-LOCAL COLLABORATION (2003). 
 113. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 236, 250-57 (1979). 
 114. JEREMY M. WILSON, COMMUNITY POLICING IN AMERICA 2 (2006). 
 115. Kevin Stenson, Community Policing as a Governmental Technology, 22 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 373, 383-85 (1993).  Some critics, however, question the extent of consent and colla-
boration involved in the strategy precisely because of its localization. Paul Gordon, 
Community Policing: Towards the Local Police State?, 4 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 39, 56 
(1984). 
 116. Jayne Seagrave, Defining Community Policing, 15 AM. J. POLICE 1, 7 (1996). 
 117. ROBERT TROJANOWICZ ET AL., COMMUNITY POLICING: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE 6 (2d ed. 1998). 
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can become a better and safer place in which to live and work.”118  Com-
munity policing requires a relaxation of police hierarchy, broad discretion 
to individual departments, and attention to neighborhood-specific problems 
and incidents.119 
Similarly conducive to localized policing is a focus on carefully identi-
fied problem areas, referred to as “hot spots,” and increased proactive po-
lice presence in these areas.120  Numerous controlled studies have proven 
hot spots policing to be more effective than traditional reactive policing.121  
Hot spots policing is rooted in place-specific theories of crime, and subse-
quently, its successful implementation requires a good level of acquain-
tance with the local field and its particular problems and challenges.122 
Other factors that support the localization of policing is fear of crime and 
public demand for accountability.123  The emphasis on risk generated pub-
lic reliance on a multitude of agencies.124 
Fragmentation and specialization, however, are only one force among 
many that have shaped changes in policing.  Police agencies constantly 
balance between the need for uniformity (civil liability, accreditation, tech-
nology, war on drugs), diversity (community policing, police unions), ba-
lancing forces, and the big picture (policing American societies and 
streets).  Each police agency is the product of a unique balance of forces 
within its jurisdiction.  It is this balance that explains the difference be-
tween police agencies.125 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. WILSON, supra note 114, at 41-42. 
 120. Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A Systematic Review 
of Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317-18 (2005). 
 121. Id. at 328-30. 
 122. David Weisburd et al., Contrasting Crime General and Crime Specific Theory: The 
Case of Hot Spots of Crime, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 45, 50-52 
(Freda Adler & Wiliam S. Laufer eds., 1993). 
 123. David I. Ashby, Policing Neighbourhoods: Exploring the Geographies of Crime, 
Policing and Performance Assessment, 15 POLICING & SOC’Y 413, 421, 435 (2005).  For 
more on the impact of fear of crime on all aspects of public policy, see JONATHAN SIMON, 
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007). 
 124. ERICSON & HAGGERTY, supra note 108, at 3-14. 
 125. ROBERT H. LANGWORTHY & LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III, POLICING IN AMERICA: A 
BALANCE IN FORCES (1994).  One force that has impacted police in the opposite direction is 
the introduction of COMPSTAT as a management technique that emphasized hierarchy and 
close supervision of regional commanders. James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of 
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police 
Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 151-55 (2007).  It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that COMPSTAT has been implemented almost exclusively in large metropolitan 
areas and at the municipal level, and that its implementation in tandem with community po-
licing presents various challenges. James J. Willis et al., COMPSTAT and Community 
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B. Fragmentation and the Problem of Accountability 
The fragmented nature of policing presents several challenges.  The ma-
jor source of concern is poor organization, stemming from redundancy of 
services and hierarchy.126  Some studies, however, recognized situations in 
which fragmented policing actually increases law enforcement efficiency.  
As Mark Button, Tim John, and Nigel Brearley mention, some forms of of-
fenders, such as militant environmentalists, are best addressed through or-
ganized surveillance and action conducted by several agencies separately, 
cooperating with regard to information.127  But this must be weighed 
against the ability to safeguard quality and citizens’ rights in the face of in-
creasingly multilateralized policing.128  Martha Minow suggests that frag-
mentation, particularly when multiple agencies are privatized, offers the 
advantages of improved quality and competition.129  There are also advan-
tages in localized services that have to do with the need to reach multiple 
constituencies in a personal way: “[i]t makes sense for a nation as large as 
the United States to recognize and value the capacities of groups smaller 
than the nation or the state but bigger than the individual or the family.”130  
She expresses, however, serious concerns about accountability and com-
mitment to civil rights and welfare.131 
If Minow’s argument can be restricted to situations in which public ser-
vices are privatized, Donald Dobkin expresses concern about “the Admin-
istrative State” as a set of separate actors that are alienated from citizen 
concern, and whose decisionmaking is likely to be immune to review due 
to the courts’ deference.132  Similarly, David Markell has argued that ex-
cessive regulation reduces transparency and therefore hinders accountabili-
ty.133  According to Markell, the increased fragmentation allows govern-
ment to achieve its goals through important allies, but the government 
 
Policing: Lessons from the Field, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Criminology, Atlanta, Georgia, (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.allacademic 
.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/0/2/6/pages200265/p200265-1.php. 
 126. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 7, at 52. 
 127. Mark Button et al., New Challenges in Public Order Policing: The 
Professionalisation of Environmental Protest and the Emergence of the Militant 
Environmental Activist, 30 INT’L J. SOC. L. 17, 27-30 (2002). 
 128. BAYLEY & SHEARING, supra note 72, at 29-32. 
 129. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1241 (2003). 
 130. Id. at 1245. 
 131. Id. at 1260. 
 132. Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for 
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 364-65 (2008). 
 133. David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005). 
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subsequently loses the ability to exert complete control over its opera-
tions.134  Markell also highlights the fact that fragmentation creates more 
regulator/regulated relationships.135  Ronald Moe, examining the “reinvent-
ing government” initiative of the early 1990s, critiques the movement for 
reducing traditional accountability by reducing hierarchy within agen-
cies.136 
Some commentators draw distinctions between different agencies and 
conditions with regard to the desirability of fragmentation.  Colin Scott, 
who sees governmental fragmentation and redundancy in services as a 
positive development overall, nevertheless expresses concern about the un-
dermining of traditional accountability structures with increased fragmenta-
tion.137  Dorit Reiss, who studied the liberalization in markets of pluralized 
service providers, comes to the conclusion that in such situations “the ques-
tion is less ‘how much’ accountability there is, but what form it takes.”138  
She finds that agencies tended to be accountable to stakeholders for the 
services they provided (electricity and telecommunications), except in situ-
ations that required expert technical judgment.139  Michael Ting, presenting 
a game theory model, argues that fragmentation and redundancy of service 
is a positive phenomenon when the different agencies have different goals 
in mind, but not when they share the same goals.140 
While accountability issues are important for various types of agencies, 
problems of accountability are particularly acute with regard to the police.  
Even commentators who identify situations in which fragmentation is bene-
ficial to accountability find that police fragmentation presents a unique set 
of problems.  While localized police agencies possess unique goals and ex-
pertise pertaining to their particular community, they share the broader goal 
of crime control and law enforcement.  The police are not only a service 
agency but also a coercive power.  Concerns about abuse and lack of ac-
countability are much more salient than with regard to service providers.  
 
 134. Id. at 7-8. 
 135. Id. at 8. 
 136. Ronald C. Moe, The “Reinventing Government” Exercise: Misinterpreting the 
Problem, Misjudging the Consequences, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 111, 113-16 (1994). 
 137. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38 (2000). 
 138. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Agency Accountability Strategies After Liberalization: 
Universal Service in the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden, 31 LAW & POL’Y 111, 111 
(2009). 
 139. Id. at 131-33. 
 140. Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 274 (2003). 
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In addition, echoing Dobkin’s concerns,141 courts are increasingly deferent 
to police decisionmaking, particularly in Fourth Amendment contexts.142 
Ian Loader pointed out that the multiplicity of institutional forms in-
volved in police services presents challenges to several suppositions about 
the relationship between police and government.  Loader argues for prin-
ciples of police regulation that connect policing to processes of public will 
formation but remain plausible under the altered conditions of plural and 
networked policing.143  As Loader explains, 
we can no longer adequately make sense of policing (if, indeed, we ever 
could) as the attempt of a sovereign body (the state) to exercise control 
over a bounded territory by means of a single institution (the police) in 
which is vested a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence—
significant though that body and that institution are likely to remain.144 
Instead, the developments in policing techniques 
call attention . . . to the appearance of a multiplicity of agencies, relation-
ships, programmes and techniques by which the ordering of social life is 
carried out.  In terms of regulation, these transformations indicate that we 
can no longer solely concern ourselves with how the public police can be 
made accountable to government, whether by legal, democratic or—as 
has been prominent of late—managerialist means.  The pluralization of 
policing has generated a situation in which established intra-
organizational modes of accountability (and their supporting structures of 
thought) are rendered limited and inadequate, and where novel policing 
forms are fast outstripping the capacity of existing institutional arrange-
ments to monitor and control them.  The world of plural policing remains, 
at best, weakly or obscurely accountable.145 
To Loader, plural policing presents disadvantages in shifting responsibil-
ity for crime prevention to the citizens146 and a sense of overregulation 
stemming from the multiplicity of the “quiet force of policing” that governs 
life from unexpected places.147 
 
 141. Dobkin, supra note 132, at 364-65. 
 142. This was true even at the height of the Warren Court era: “[I]t is frequently argued 
that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the 
police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the 
amount of information they possess.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).  For more on 
the courts’ consistent deference to police discretion and its causes, see Aviram & Portman, 
supra note 2. 
 143. Ian Loader, Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
323, 323-24 (2000). 
 144. Id. at 324. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 331. 
 147. Id. at 333. 
AVIRAM ET AL._CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:40 PM 
2010] MOVING TARGETS: GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE 729 
More specifically, Claudia Dahlerus, who sampled nineteen European 
countries, found a strong correlation between institutional decentralization 
and repressive policing, finding that respect for civil rights decreases in de-
centralized settings, particularly pertaining to police repression of prote-
sters and civil and political rights violations overall.148  Some propositions 
to amend these problems on the policy level include creating a certain stra-
tification of police services, according to which law enforcement problems 
are solved on the neighborhood level and with the community’s support.149 
These critiques suggest that serious concerns accompany police frag-
mentation.  As we argue next, Herring increases the importance of syste-
matically and formally addressing these concerns. 
C. Concerns of Inefficiency and Abuse 
When read in the context of fragmentation, Herring sends a problematic 
message to police agencies.  The Court does not expect one police agency 
to be accountable for the mistakes of another.  This premise is problematic 
in several ways. 
First, the lack of unified accountability and existence of multiple agen-
cies means that a person might be subject to search, seizure, and other ma-
nifestations of police power vis-à-vis several agencies simultaneously.  
This presents people with the difficulty of claiming redress from multiple 
agents in case of violation or mistake. 
In addition, the Herring decision downplays deterrence.  Fourth 
Amendment litigation consistently relies on the exclusionary rule as the 
best way to enforce provisions,150 and concern about the quality of deter-
rence was a driving force behind the Good Faith Doctrine’s design.151 Em-
 
 148. Claudia Dahlerus, Who’s Minding the Locals?  Decentralization, Diversity, and 
Political Conflict in European Democracies, Paper Presentated at the Annual Meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/7/1/3/pages197138/p1
97138-1.php. 
 149. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 138 (1994). 
 150. In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court stated: 
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right . . . could not consistently 
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion 
of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlaw-
ful seizure.  To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its 
privilege and enjoyment. 
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
 151. For example, in Hudson v. Michigan, the Court stated: 
We have rejected indiscriminate application of the rule and have held it to be ap-
plicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served,—that is, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. 
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pirical findings do exist that support the power of the exclusionary rule.152  
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for upholding Evans 
was the assumption that suppression of evidence would not properly deter 
court records from computer blunders.153  The expansion in Herring, how-
ever, implies that police agencies are not deterred when penalized for the 
mistakes of other agencies.  Because such an assumption cannot always be 
the case, at a minimum, further analysis of actual deterrence is required. 
Finally, Herring’s implicit deference to police fragmentation risks disin-
centivizing police agencies from consolidating and working mutually and 
efficiently.  The concern is that agencies will prefer fragmentation to the 
risks and burdens of shouldering greater accountability.  While Herring it-
self is unlikely to generate broad organizational changes within the police, 
in conjunction with other factors, the decision may lead to further fragmen-
tation and overspecialization within departments and agencies. 
III.  UNTANGLING THE ACCOUNTABILITY MESS: LEGAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A. Agent Identity’s Importance to the Exclusionary Rule 
Since the identity of the agent or agency who made the mistake is inti-
mately connected to the effectiveness of deterrence, this factor has been 
taken into consideration in various contexts of judicial review of policing.  
It is important to keep in mind that, since 1984, the good faith exception 
has assumed an application in a number of areas where courts previously 
struggled to define the proper remedy for seemingly minor errors.  The case 
law now covers a broad array of conduct and circumstances with some-
times-contradictory relationships. 
In Boyd v. United States,154 the Supreme Court first established an ex-
clusionary rule based on a fusion of Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure and Fifth Amendment protection from 
 
. . . [W]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular 
case . . . is an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. 
547 U.S. 586, 591-92 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 152. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1950-1990 11 (1993).  Interestingly, Walker has expressed dissatisfaction with the 
misinterpretation of his findings by Justice Scalia in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 
(2006), where his evidence in support of the success of the exclusionary rule was cited in 
support of an argument that the rule has already “worked” and is therefore no longer neces-
sary. Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at 5. 
 153. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995). 
 154. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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self-incrimination.  The Court struggled to define the basis for exclusion 
and relied heavily on protection from self-incrimination: 
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty and security.  They reach further than the concrete form of 
the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they 
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes [sic] 
of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.  It is not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes 
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty. [sic] and private property, where that 
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,—
it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the 
essence of Lord CAMDEN’s judgment.  Breaking into a house and open-
ing boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible 
and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony, or of his private pa-
pers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his 
goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.  In this regard the 
fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each other.155 
The Court’s opinion relied heavily on a famous British case discussing 
government intrusion more generally.  Justice Bradley cited Entick v. Car-
rington,156 a decision by Lord Camden in 1765, and explained that, “his 
great judgment on that occasion is considered as on [sic] of the landmarks 
of English liberty.”157  Reliance on Entick links the exclusionary rule to the 
social contract and the premise that legitimate government acts only when 
within the social contract. 
In Entick, the jury found by special verdict that a member of the King’s 
Privy Council, the Earl of Halifax, issued a warrant to officers to search on 
November 6, 1782.158  Officers executed the warrant on November 11, 
1782.159  Lord Camden rejected several arguments regarding the identity of 
the Earl of Halifax as a magistrate and then took up the question of the le-
gality of the warrant itself.160  Lord Camden looked to the social contract 
and tort of trespass to explain the origin of a challenge to property seizures 
by the government: 
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their 
property.  That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all in-
stances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law 
 
 155. Id. at 630. 
 156. 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765). 
 157. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. 
 158. Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1029. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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for the good of the whole.  The cases where this right of property is set 
aside by private law, are various.  Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes 
etc are all of this description; wherein every man by common consent 
gives up that right, for the sake of justice and the general good.  By the 
laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, 
is a trespass.  No man can set his foot upon my ground without my li-
cense, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which 
is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called 
upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil.  If 
he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some 
positive law has empowered or excused him.  The justification is submit-
ted to the judges, who are to look into the books; and if such a justifica-
tion can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles 
of common law. [sic]  If no excuse can be found or produced, the silence 
of the books is an authority against the defendant, and the plaintiff must 
have judgment.161 
Lord Camden went on to distinguish special procedures for warrants to 
recover stolen property and rejected the claimed private privilege of office 
to search.162  Finally, he cited to the English revolution for the principle 
that the King cannot violate the law by necessity and explained, “If the 
king himself has no power to declare when the law ought to be violated for 
reason of state, I am sure we his judges have no such prerogative.”163  En-
tick and Boyd firmly tie the origins of the exclusionary rule to the idea that 
government only acts legitimately where it acts within the proper bounda-
ries of authority. 
B. Struggling with Accountability: State Solutions for Fragmentation 
Problems 
The problem of fashioning proper deterrence standards in fragmentation 
situations comes up in various stages of the criminal process.  One particu-
lar example is the Petite policy, which places policy limits on the dual so-
vereignty doctrine by refraining from prosecuting in multiple jurisdictions 
for the same crime unless absolutely necessary.164  For the purposes of this 
Article, however, we focus on two examples pertaining to policing: (1) ex-
ecution of county-to-county state warrants, and (2) the assessment of war-
rant overbreadth.  Different court systems relying on the same general prin-
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).  The Petite policy is an example of the 
systematic use of discretion to evaluate and resolve issues of prosecutorial fragmentation. 
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ciples consider agency in fashioning the proper scope of deterrent reme-
dies, albeit in a different applications. 
1. County-to-County State Warrants and the Federal Fundamental Test 
The Supreme Court established a firm Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule in 1914,165 but later held that the rule did not apply to States.166  The 
Court reversed course in 1961 and incorporated the exclusionary rule 
against the States in Mapp v. Ohio.167  As federal and state law enforce-
ment agencies cooperated, federal courts confronted unique issues of juris-
diction and competence.  California developed new analyses that took into 
account its own different agencies and federal courts applied a non-
constitutional exclusionary remedy.  Both eventually drifted toward the ap-
plication of the standard good faith analysis in Leon. 
A California judge may issue a warrant to search in any county, so long 
as there is probable cause that the evidence they expect to find is linked to a 
crime committed in the judge’s county.168  The judge, however, must order 
law enforcement from his own county to conduct the search in the county 
where the evidence is to be found.169  The limitation emerged in People v. 
Fleming after dicta from two previous decisions compelled a definitive an-
swer to the question.170  In People v. Grant, the California First District 
Court of Appeal published that “[w]e find little authority, but nevertheless 
considerable reason, supporting the theory that the effect of a search war-
rant should be limited at least to the county of its origin.”171  The court 
upheld the search on the basis of hot pursuit.172  In People v. Ruster, a de-
fendant challenged a Santa Clara County judge’s decision to issue a war-
 
 165. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  Within four years, the Court ex-
panded the rule to include indirect evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385 (1920). 
 166. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 167. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 168. People v. Fleming, 631 P.2d 38, 44 (Cal. 1981); see also People v. Galvan, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 195, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).  However, California judges may not issue a warrant 
to search out of state. See Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873).  Thus, in order to 
execute an out-of-state warrant, California law enforcement officers must seek an out-of-
state law enforcement agency and find an officer who will swear to the contents of the war-
rant before a competent court of that State, with a clause providing for the retention of the 
evidence by California law enforcement officers and California courts.  Those officers then 
execute the warrant and transfer the evidence to California officers. See generally ALAMEDA 
COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION  (12 ed. 2008). 
 169. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528(a) (West 2009). 
 170. 631 P.2d 38, 43-44 (Cal. 1981). 
 171. People v. Grant, 81 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1969). 
 172. Id. at 816. 
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rant to search his apartment in San Mateo County.  The California Supreme 
Court published a similar hypothetical dictum, 
If the property of a stranger to a criminal investigation were seized in one 
county pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate in another county, it 
might well be inconvenient for him to contest the validity of the search or 
seizure in the county issuing the warrant.  But that is not the case here.173 
Nevertheless, they upheld the search on the narrow facts because the de-
fendant was already in Santa Clara County’s custody at the time of the 
search.174 
Subsequently, Fleming challenged a Santa Barbara County judge’s deci-
sion to issue a search warrant to be executed on his property in Los An-
geles County and reached the California Supreme Court relying on the dic-
ta above.  He argued that the judge did not have jurisdiction to issue the 
warrant.175  The Supreme Court recognized the competing interest of the 
defendant to discourage law enforcement from forum shopping for a judge 
to issue a warrant and the need to contest the evidence where it is seized, as 
well as the State’s need for access to the evidence to go forward with a 
criminal proceeding and struck a balance by limiting the magistrate’s pow-
er to issue the warrant to crimes committed in his county.176  The court held 
that “a magistrate has jurisdiction to issue an out-of-county warrant when 
he has probable cause to believe that the evidence sought relates to a crime 
committed within his county and thus pertains to a present or future prose-
cution in that county.”177 
Fleming, however, is not a federal constitutional principle and it did not 
survive California’s ban on independent state grounds for the exclusion of 
evidence.178  In a voter initiative, California voters found that, “broad re-
forms in the procedural treatment of accused persons and the disposition 
and sentencing of convicted persons are necessary and proper as deterrents 
to criminal behavior and to serious disruption of people’s lives.”179  Accor-
dingly, they passed a law that was later interpreted to eliminate all inde-
 
 173. People v. Ruster, 548 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1976). 
 174. Id. 
 175. He also asserted generally that the warrant lacked probable cause. 
 176. People v. Fleming, 631 P.2d 38, 43-44 (Cal. 1981). 
 177. Id. at 44. 
 178. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985).  Justice Mosk dissented from this inter-
pretation of voter intent in Proposition 8 noting that, “[t]he avowed purpose of Proposition 8 
is thus to implement safeguards for victims of crimes and to deal more harshly with violent 
criminals.” Id. at 768 (Mosk, J., dissenting).  He explained that interpreting the requirement 
to admit all relevant evidence would remove many safeguards to victims. Id.  However, the 
principle is now well settled in California law. 
 179.  In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 768 n.8. 
AVIRAM ET AL._CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:40 PM 
2010] MOVING TARGETS: GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE 735 
pendent state grounds for the exclusion of evidence.180  Thus, California 
courts had to determine whether the Fleming rule could survive under fed-
eral law. 
In People v. Ruiz, the Placer County narcotics task force requested and 
received a warrant for Sacramento County but failed to specifically state 
that the confidential informant’s controlled buys occurred in Placer Coun-
ty.181  The Attorney General accepted the error and relied exclusively on 
the good faith rule to justify the search.182  The Court of Appeal agreed and 
after an extensive discussion of jurisdiction,183 the court ultimately con-
cluded that, 
[I]t is nevertheless clear that the Fleming limitation does not implicate a 
magistrate’s jurisdiction in the fundamental sense of the power to hear 
and determine the matter, nor does it implicate traditional Fourth 
Amendment standards.  Accordingly, the failure to comply with the Flem-
ing rule is not a type of irregularity which will, on its face, preclude appli-
cation of the Leon rule.  Of course, where an officer engages in forum 
shopping and knowingly or recklessly misleads the magistrate then the 
good faith required for application of the Leon rule will be lacking.  But 
where good faith otherwise exists, the failure to include a Fleming show-
ing in the affidavit for a search warrant does not render the affidavit con-
stitutionally deficient and does not compel suppression under the Fourth 
Amendment.184 
Accordingly, courts continue to apply the Ruiz analysis to allow searches 
in good faith, despite a California law enforcement officer’s mistake re-
garding which county’s magistrate he should approach with his warrant re-
quest.185  Thus, the Fleming rule has been subsumed into the good faith ex-
ception, fundamentally linking the issue of who seeks the warrant and who 
issues it to the good faith exception of the warrant clause. 
In making the Ruiz decision, California courts looked to an extensive 
body of federal case law interpreting who has the authority to issue a war-
rant under the good faith rule.  The Ruiz decision discussed a number of 
cases that used a non-fundamental and fundamental test to determine the 
remedy for common errors between agency interactions.186  Ultimately, 
 
 180. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a). 
 181. People v. Ruiz, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886, 888 (1990). 
 182. Id. at 890. 
 183. Id. at 891-95. 
 184. Id. at 894-95. 
 185. See, e.g., People v. Galvan, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
 186. See Ruiz, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (citing United States v. Luk, 859 F.2d 667, 671-72 
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 440-41 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331, 
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Leon’s good faith test subsumed a substantial part of the test for dealing 
with these types of problems.187 
The legal change that Ruiz noted took some time.  One year after the Su-
preme Court decided United States v. Leon in 1984,188 the Ninth Circuit 
confronted good faith reliance on a Rule of Criminal Procedure (i.e. Rule 
41) in United States v. Ritter.189  In Ritter, Border Patrol agents sought a 
telephonic warrant from a state magistrate rather than a federal judge as re-
quired by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.190  Rule 41 
provided that, “If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a 
written affidavit, a Federal magistrate may issue a warrant based upon 
sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate 
means.”191  However, the Court of Appeals explained that the Rule did not 
allow State magistrates to dispense with formalities and issue federal war-
rants by telephone.192  At the time, Ninth Circuit precedent provided that 
errors violating the Fourth Amendment were fundamental and suppression 
automatic, while technical errors only required suppression if there was 
prejudice or deliberate disregard of the rule.193  Thus, Ritter stated a non-
constitutional good faith rule.  On the facts, the Ninth Circuit assumed a 
technical error for this kind of violation of Rule 41 and affirmed the trial 
court’s findings of no prejudice or deliberate disregard on the record.194  
The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly discuss the constitutional good faith 
standard of Leon in the decision. 
One year later, the Fifth Circuit also addressed a violation of Rule 41 by 
federal and state interaction and explicitly re-evaluated its rationale for au-
tomatic suppression.195  In United States v. Comstock, the Fifth Circuit ex-
plained, 
[W]here there is no constitutional violation nor prejudice in the sense that 
the search would likely not have occurred or been as abrasive or intrusive 
had Rule 41 been followed, suppression in these circumstances is not ap-
 
332-33 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 187. Ruiz, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
 188. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 189. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435. 
 190. Id. at 440-41.  The relevant rule of criminal procedure has been materially changed 
since this case. 
 191. Id. at 440 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41). 
 192. Id. at 441. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. United States v. Comstock, 805 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1986); see also United 
States v. Luk, 859 F.2d 667, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s adoption 
of the rule). 
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propriate if the officers concerned acted in the affirmative good faith be-
lief that the warrant was valid and authorized their conduct.  Good faith in 
this context implies not only that Rule 41 was not knowingly and inten-
tionally violated, but also that the officers did not act in reckless disregard 
or conscious indifference to whether it applied and was complied with.  
On the other hand, for these purposes, we do not mean by “good faith” 
that the officers’ conduct must be objectively reasonable.  We recognize, 
of course, that in Leon and Sheppard objective reasonableness was re-
quired to avoid suppression where the Fourth Amendment had been vi-
olated.  Nevertheless, we believe that a less stringent standard is appropri-
ate where, as here, we are not concerned with deterring unconstitutional 
conduct.196 
In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit rejected appellant’s distinction between 
reliance on a state magistrate and reliance on state law enforcement officers 
for the basis of the violation.197  The Court first pointed out that it created a 
lesser standard than the good faith exception for constitutional violations 
for Rule 41 violations, but also proceeded to question the application of the 
distinction to constitutional violations under Leon.198 
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit again confronted the issue of a Rule 
41 violation and the fundamental/non-fundamental test described in Ritter 
and Comstock.  This time, the Ninth Circuit held that courts must also ap-
ply the standard good faith test of United States v. Leon if they find sup-
pression necessary under the fundamental/non-fundamental test.199  In 
United States v. Luk, an agent of the Department of Commerce’s Office of 
Export Enforcement obtained a warrant for a search at the direction of an 
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”), but the record did not show 
that the AUSA or anyone from his office spoke to the magistrate.200  Thus, 
the court found a technical violation.201  After finding that the error was not 
fundamental, did not occur in bad faith, and did not result in prejudice,202 
however, the Ninth Circuit did not end its inquiry.  Rather, the court went 
on to consider the good faith test under United States v. Leon in dicta.  The 
Ninth Circuit explained, “Even if the instant Rule 41 violation were initial-
ly determined to be either a fundamental or a suppression-required nonfun-
 
 196. Comstock, 805 F.2d at 1207. 
 197. Id. at 1210 n.18. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Luk, 859 F.2d at 674-75. 
 200. Id. at 669. 
 201. Id. at 673. 
 202. Id. at 674. 
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damental violation, then the suppression sanction is still not required under 
Leon.”203 
Thus, both state and federal courts have used the good faith exception as 
the general framework for a wide variety of issues since its inception.  
Formerly divergent tests have come together under one principle with 
widely distinct applications. 
2. Whose Affidavit?  Curing Overbreadth 
Additionally, courts have also taken into account identity of officers to 
cure warrant overbreadth, in this case forgiving more where the applying 
officer executes a warrant than where another officer executes.  The general 
rule is that a warrant must contain sufficient particularity or it is unconstitu-
tional.204  However, one important factor is the knowledge of the officer 
executing the warrant.  In United States v. Gitcho, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that great importance can be given to the fact that authorities knew 
the property to be searched and held it to be searched while obtaining the 
warrant, despite several specific deficiencies in the warrant obtained.205 
The actual knowledge of the officer and agency that he comes from can 
be of vital importance.  In Luk, the Ninth Circuit considered the actual 
knowledge of the affiant and the officer executing a search warrant to cure 
it from overbreadth under the good faith analysis.  First, the court consi-
dered the knowledge of the affiant and explained, 
Unlike our decision in United States v. Washington, there is no evidence 
here that the affiant, Agent Koplik, knew the warrant was overbroad.  Nor 
is there any evidence that would support a claim that Koplik was “dishon-
est or reckless in preparing [her] affidavit.”  On the contrary, the affidavit 
was diligently prepared by Koplik with Rossbacher’s assistance.206 
The court recognized that under its own precedent an affidavit must be 
attached and incorporated by reference to cure overbreadth.  However, the 
court considered the officer executing the warrant’s knowledge of and ap-
plication of the twenty-two page affidavit to limit his search to relevant 
evidence: 
[T]he affidavit did act as this sort of limit on the search.  Agent Bammer, 
who was specifically authorized to execute the warrant, read Agent Kop-
lik’s affidavit prior to the search; at the briefing immediately prior to the 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 205. United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Harman v. 
Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Gitcho for this proposition). 
 206. Luk, 859 F.2d at 677 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
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warrant’s execution, Koplik apprised Bammer and the two other agents 
who assisted in the search of the particular items to seize; Koplik was 
present at the premises and advised the agents concerning what items 
were properly within the scope of the search; and the agents specifically 
relied on the affidavit in determining at the scene what items were proper-
ly within the scope of the search.207 
Thus, the court directly reviewed the communication of officers when 
deciding particularity.  The fact that officers are closely connected aided 
the good faith argument because the officers knew what they sought and 
clearly pursued a limited course of conduct to obtain, eliminating the prob-
lem of particularity and allowing the good faith exception. 
C. Proposed Solution: Incorporating Agency Identity into the Good 
Faith Standard 
In order to generate a more consistent Good Faith Doctrine, future deci-
sions must be aware of the need to carefully assess when a deterrent reme-
dy is appropriate.  While the Herring court referred to “our repeated hold-
ings that the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and 
outweigh any harm to the justice system,”208 it is important to remember 
that the good faith rule—and, with it, immunity from deterrent remedies—
expanded significantly since it emerged in 1984.  While the limited excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule, such as attenuation,209 inevitable discov-
ery,210 and good faith211 have expanded, no overall test for the expansion 
has been developed.  Nor have courts developed an intellectually honest 
system for weighing the exclusionary rule under the circumstances. 
Lower courts currently struggle with the scope of the Herring decision.  
One District Court sought to limit the decision to preclude its application to 
warrantless searches212 while acknowledging an appellate decision in the 
same Circuit that can be read to suggest application to warrantless 
searches.213  The Herring opinion seems to invite courts to read it broadly, 
but provides little guidance as to how to apply it to new facts. 
 
 207. Id. at 677. 
 208. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009). 
 209. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 210. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 211. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 212. See, e.g., United States v. McCarty, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Haw. 2009) (Herring 
does not apply to warrantless TSA searches). 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Monghur, 576 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2009) (re-
manding for a container search without a warrant). 
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The Canadian Supreme Court did provide such guidance to courts in 
Canada.  The court applied a three-step approach to the suppression of evi-
dence: 
When faced with an application for exclusion under s. 24(2), a court must 
assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confi-
dence in the justice system having regard to: (1) the seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing state conduct, (2) the impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the accused, and (3) society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case on its merits.  At the first stage, the court consid-
ers the nature of the police conduct that infringed the Charter and led to 
the discovery of the evidence.  The more severe or deliberate the state 
conduct that led to the Charter violation, the greater the need for the 
courts to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evidence 
linked to that conduct, in order to preserve public confidence in and en-
sure state adherence to the rule of law.  The second stage of the inquiry 
calls for an evaluation of the extent to which the breach actually under-
mined the interests protected by the infringed right.  The more serious the 
incursion on these interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evi-
dence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  At the 
third stage, a court asks whether the truth seeking function of the criminal 
trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence or by its 
exclusion.  Factors such as the reliability of the evidence and its impor-
tance to the Crown’s case should be considered at this stage.  The weigh-
ing process and the balancing of these concerns is a matter for the trial 
judge in each case.  Where the trial judge has considered the proper fac-
tors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference to his or her 
ultimate determination.214 
The Canadian solution expressly directs inferior courts to discuss the 
impact of the exclusion on the record, the lesson to police and the prosecu-
tors, the societal value that suppression supports, and the means by which 
suppression in a particular case will further those goals.  In another deci-
sion, the Canadian Supreme Court demonstrated in a vigorous debate how 
the principle that it asked lower courts to apply could be argued, as justices 
 
 214. R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, 2009 SCC 32, ¶¶ 71-85 (Can.) (emphasis added); 
see also Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 
62 JUDICATURE 215, 216 (1978) (noting universal rejection of the American rule by other 
common law jurisdictions). But see Hedieh Nasheri, The Exclusionary Rule: Differing 
Trends in Canada and the United States, 21 CRIM. JUST. REV. 161, 162 (1996) (arguing that 
Canada will expand its exclusionary rule as the United States contracts to suppress less evi-
dence). 
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fought over whether the justice system could be associated with the fla-
grancy of certain police conduct.215 
In future decisions on the Good Faith Doctrine, the Supreme Court 
might find it useful to provide lower courts with some guidance regarding 
the appropriateness of exclusion.  In the context of fragmented policing, the 
identity of the actors, the size of the agency, the degree of collaboration be-
tween agencies, and the reasonable level of mutual reliance expected from 
agencies with overlapping or close jurisdictions should be taken into ac-
count.  It would not be difficult to provide such guidelines as a way to in-
ject the Herring mens rea standard with content.  After all, in order to as-
sess the degree of negligence involved in a policing mistake, the court re-
lies on external parameters for the egregiousness of the mistake.  Agency 
identity provides important variables to be weighted in the analysis.  A ba-
lancing test would also have the advantage of consistency with the strong 
preference for warrants: the rule provides a means for officers subject to a 
variety of jurisdictions to ensure the validity of their cases and provides a 
simple means for prosecutors from every jurisdiction to encourage their of-
ficers to seek the involvement of a magistrate, regardless of where the case 
will be filed.  Additionally, the rule encourages courts to actively consider 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule on the facts in front of them and 
create a record of the error and the reason for the error. 
CONCLUSION 
Our reading of Herring suggests that the decision was informed by a 
realist assessment of fragmented policing; however, realism in itself, par-
ticularly when implicit, is not enough.  While Herring invites our courts to 
second-guess a blanket exclusionary rule, there is no similar systematic ap-
proach or test for our courts to apply.  The assumptions of many scholarly 
analyses continue to avoid discussion of many of the differences that un-
derlie the broad test for the good faith exception. 
The Court must be honest about the interests that it is asking lower 
courts to weigh.  The solution includes, at minimum, a declaration that in 
cases where police obtain evidence pursuant to a warrant, the court must 
weigh a balancing-test accounting for these questions.  A clear standard 
enables trial courts to exercise the necessary judicial review of deterrence 
rationales in Herring-type cases, ensuring that the exception does not swal-
low the rule.  Additionally, creating the proper incentives for police de-
partments to perform their individual and collaborative duties diligently 
 
 215. Compare R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, 2009 SCC 34, ¶¶ 25-42 (Can.) with R. 
v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, 2009 SCC 32, ¶¶ 71-73 (Can.) (Deschamps, J., dissenting). 
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and effectively generates professional, cost-effective policing, thus enhanc-
ing policing services for the community’s benefit as well as protecting citi-
zens’ rights and freedoms. 
